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The
Illusion
of
Civil D

of Civil Defense

Two ominous events-the t&ing of giant weep
ons in the Soviet Union and the sponmmhip of
fallout shelters by our own Federal Government
-compel each one of us to urntemplate thermonuclear war at close range. We have lived with
the p i b i l i q of this ahmity for more than a
decade. W e must now reckon with its probability.
No one in tbisaudience, I suppe, will question
my declaration that the
Union,by resuming the t d n g of nofear weapons, has increased
the danger of war, f mspect, however, that I mu&
document my charge that shelter-building in the
U.S. also brings World War m cIoser. You should
know at the outset that the doeurnentation will
compel us here and POW to that eluse-mxage contemplationof thermonuclear war. Whenyou have
apprehended the nature of the war, I M e w you
d join me in the codusion that civil defellse is
an illusion- anillusionthat placesour W t u t i o n ~
and our l i v i~n jeopardy.
The citizenwhosets out to etudy thermonuclear
war d find himself richly supplied with literature by hb Government. 1 h a ~ ereviewed this
materid, and I must tell you that I hd it to be
incomplete md uneven in quality and reliability.
The hard facts at the foundation of this limeture are the d t a of the weapons m w conducted

by our Government over the past 16 years-some
t 60 shots totaling about i so megatons of exphive
energy. In spite of the magnitude of the effaexperimentsdo not answer all our questions.
For one thing, the results are not available to the
citizenin t
h
eentirev. In the second place, t h e
t& have bwn conducted in the wilderness of
Nwada or on barren coral atolls in the South
P W . They do xmt, therefore, t
d us what a
thermonuclear exploehn would a c t d l y do to a
crowded city at home-or to our forem and crop
laads. For direct demomtmtion of what might
happen here we have onlythe experience with the
nominal atomichmb at Hkmhima and M a g d .
But one quickly learm that e x p i e m e with kilotan weapons has no direct applhtiofl to the
potential effects of weapons in t h e megaton range.

On this fimited,iacomp1ete and uncertain data
there has grown a vast sewndmy literature. Here
one finds the fruit of pxhtispeculative investigations
conductedby dvildefense agencies, by the Atomic
h e r C~ o d n and the armed s e h , by
certain academic indtutions and individuals and
by such quasi-independent o r g ~ t l o n s the
Rand Carprationworking under
h r the
armed semim and other governmental agencies.
Much of the matmid b convenimtly pckapd
for reference in the
of the several
Congrw&nal h9aring.S on the biohgicd and envimmentaleffectsof nuclearwar andcid defeme
qpha those effm, that have made newspper
headlines during the past ten years.
Careful and cxiticd reading of the seeondray
literattam s
b that the second- investigations
it reports are no less specuIative for the fact that

t

they have been conducted under the rubric of
"operations research" and f d t u t e d by the employment of large cornputem. It is evident that
the assumptions fed into the computers heavily
condition the results.

The work reportedin thisliterature is threaded
with two major strands of bias. One strong bias
originates from the desire to anvision and secure
a s i g d c a n t civil defense. As one witnees put it in
the m r d of a Congressionid hearing:
.we

". .

should always emphasizethe d w n i rather than
the casualti=
'it is not what you have lost
that is most imprtant, but what you have left.' "
Tbis human tendenq is entirely underritasbble
in relation to the grave mttcmm of civil defense.
Equally understandableis the pmmm of bias that
flm from the militaq contributionto the literature. One would expect military H
e to argue
the validity of m i b y solubm to political problems, It isperhaps 1- undemtandable-andmrely
less creditable-that their quasi-independent consultants should tell them what theywant ta hear.
But you should not be swprised to learn the conclusion to wbich pre~surefrom this quarter leads.
This is that th-ucIw
war is not only possible
and probable but also feasible.
Now those who advance the feasibility of tbermonuclear war do not Jaim that it is desirable.
After living with the subject for more than a
d d e , however, these authow have 1-ed
not
to shrink from horror. They fwe facts from which
others recoil and d k q u i s h between "a hopeless
situation and a grim one," betwean a situation
that "ooutd be verg serious" and yet "not mastmphic,," between an "unprecadented catas-

...

mphe" and an " d h i t e d one." From clw study
of these dbtkctiom b y conclude that it is
pmible "to prevail in some meaningful sense of
the tern" if "pot Win."
In the calculus of feasibili~,you must realize,
civil defense plays a decisive mle. Simple arithmetic shows it is the number of survivors that
m h the diffe-ce
between an unrp.ecedented
and an llnlimited atashophe. Here the objective
of civil defenm p e a a delicate paradox. In d
humanity, we must emurage rnthat can
save the Eves of individuals. In the national
intsmt, one mu& seek to minimize the number
of casualties. But if such measures enhance &e
feasibility of thtwmmuclear war, then they may
also raise the p b a b i l i q of war. At best, they
incream the likelihad of unprecedented catastrophe. At worst, if tbe assumptiom on which the
civil def~llsemeasare predicated prove to be
wrong, they expose the nation and im people to
unlimit~dc a m p h e .
Tbe GIG
dmtrine of our national cid defense
policy is a Spartan one, By now it is familiar to
most of us: "In an atomic war, b M , heat and
initial radiation could kill &om dm to ground
zero of nuelear bursts. Many more millionswerybody eb-could be threatened by d o active fallout but most of these a u l d be saved"
No m b l e ofKcial or c o d t a n t suggests that
a n p e can be pmtected ageinst what are d e d
the "prompt" efieet4 of nuclear weapons: the
initial radiation, heat and b k But people can
be sheltered against fallout. It is qdmt fallout,
therefore, that the uvil defense p g x a m is
ahemd
Even at this d y stage of pliblic hdmbjnation
in civil defense, most p p l e ham learned to distinguish two Ends of falIout. Them is, on the one
hand, the fallout that has dtd such conoarm
during the r a n t series of Soviet tests and earlier

during the last scrim of tests conducted by the
U.S. This is the world-wide fallout that follow
a test explosion inthe atmosphere;the radioactive
k n products are tramported doft by the fireball to be dissipated in the strntosphere and to
mum to earth later in high dilution and after
great attenuation oftheir lethal energy.

There is, on the other hand, t h e local fallout,
which i~ of ( x ]to ~
civil defense. This fallout
results when a nuclear weapon is burst on tbe
ground. A major portion of the heat and blast
energy is then transferred to the gmund itself.
The explosion m o p out a crater, and the &bell
d e s tons of v a p i z d and melted material from
the p u a dupward in the air. The Won products
are n m trapped in particles of grit and dust as the
material in the fireball m h and condenses.
Secondarily, some of the material m p d from
the mater is irradiated to add to the poismoua
mass of the cloud. Qdy the fin^ partides b d
upward in t h e beball enter world-wide fallout.
Some 80 percent of the fission products fall out
locally, the heavi~tparticles settling in a circle
around the crater, the remainder riding on the
wind to fall in hgh mneentrdn w the gmund
downwind from p u n d zero.
This is the picture already engraved in the
public imagination. There is a camamphe at the
target, as at Hiroshima and N a g d , fmm which
few egCBpe. There is local fallout fromwhich t h e
who are sheltered may escape.
With this picture in mind, most people are
surprised to be reminded that thew were no
casualties from local fallout at Hiroshima or
Nagasaki, The reason is that there was no local

fallout in either of these catastrophes. As the
Pr&dent explained at the time, the two bombs
were detonated at a height calculated to minimize
the generation of b d fallout, The President did
not ga on to explain that they were detonated at
e height a h d a t e d to maximize the prompt effects
of iniaial radiation, heat and bl- Them effects
are mpprwed by as much as 40 percant in a
pundbumt in exchange for the radiologi~al
effemof local fallout or for the delivery of maximum ground s h d to a hardened military target.
Thus, as the saying goes in the vulgar lexicon of
nuclear warfare: "You can't have everything,
even when you've got an absolute weapon."

Since fallout is the only effect that ciril defense
can oope with, you h d the subject of fallout emphasiid in civil defense. As one witness tmtiiied
in June, 1959, before the Joint Conunittee on
Atomic Energy: "Fallout and iits potentidy lethaI
areas are important, but so are the areas of the
0thw.efiects; thependulum of interm has swung
to fallout and them is some tendency to overlook
the very important oth~reffects*''
It m
d
sto mason that, if a maximumnumber
of people are to be protected against fallout, then
a maximum number of people must be exposed to
fallwt in a given nuclear atta& Students of uviI
defense ham given a great deal of time to the
detailed invdgations of hypothetical fdout atIn the June 1959 hfur example,
k m s m r d agencies presented their
findings on a hypothetical attack with a weight of
about 1,500 megatons directed against milimy
and civilian targets in the continental U.S. All
the a63 weapons employed in this attack on 224

&.

targets were grwnd-burst. The computers, applying the ratiw experienced at . t W and
Nagasaki, showed 50 million mortal d t i e s ,
plus io &on
surviving casualties c a d by the
prompt effects of these weapons. But they showed
ro million more killed and lo million survi*
injured as the result of e x p u r e , without proteetion, to the effects of I d fallout. The 1-11
of
this study was that fallout shelters might have
reduced mortal casualties by a5 pemnt and the
number of injured by half.
Even more dramatic results were re@
at
the hearings hdd in August of this year by a subcommittee of the House Committee or! Government Operations under the chairmanship of
Representative Chet HolifieId. The invwtigation
mered a wide range of attacks, horn 3,000 to
lo,ooo and on up to 30,000 megatons in total
weight, directed pimadly at militay taxgets and
emploging airbursts instead of pundbumts only
when the "mfmed' of the target permitted. The
charts showedthah in the absenw of civil defense
precautions, total deaths might range fmm more
than l o percent to subtanMy loo p w n t of
the population, with &ties
at the maximum
when the entire weight of the attack was cornmitted to pundbursts. With fallout shelters
affording somewhat
protection than those
envisioned in the preent civil defense program,

these figures were shownto be reduced by as much
as 40 percent. W
i
t
h mare substantial fallout
shelters that would a h afford "nominal protee
tiun against blast," the study showed mare than
go percent of the population surviving the 3,000
megaton attack aad as much as 60 pceat d v ing the go,ooo megaton attack
Such figures M n l y come down with heavy
weight on the side of preparing substantial fallout
shelters. But the witness who reported an them
figuras was careful to moderate their impact. H e

". ..

pointed out that
the outcomes of future atraclrs are anything but predsely predictable. Fallout could cream overwhelming disaster, but it
might nut." And he added:
it depends mast
i m w t l y on the kind of war the combatants
may be prepared to @ h ~ "
W e shall return to tbis question of the kinds of
war the combatants may 5ght in a moment. The
feasibility of thermonuclear war involv~ganother
big qustbn that I should like to d d e r with

"...

you now:

I£fallout sheltem can swum a submmtid number of survivals, what kind of world will t h y
survive into? As Governor Rockefeller's Cornmime on Fallout Protection d&a the problem:
"There are many unsettled questions as to what
people should do, where they should go, to whom
they should Loog when it is safe to leave sheitem."
The mswem to these qudons are somewhat
1- precisely predictable than t h e casualty ram.
But they have been subjected to study, and the
recuperation of the nation from at least one of the
p s i b l e wu-s.hasbeen projected in a phmimry
way*
Skipping fie question of whether the weight
of the attack was given to militarg or &civilian
targets and whether casualties were- caused by
pundbursts or airbun&, we are c;p&nted with
the aftermath of a war that has devastatedthe 55
largast metqxditan M
om of the U.S. A third
of the population b been killed, half of our
industrial cupcitJrd m e d .
When it comm to recuperation, how-ever, we
must look to what Bs left: two-thirds of the population and half of the nation's industrial capacity.
It turns out, fmthmam, that we have lo& the
more expendable p n i o n of our total counnythe "A" country c o m p d of the pdncipal metropolitan mghns, aa compared with the '*B"
county of 1-r
cities and rural countpide. $'It

..
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further turns out that. wb3e the A eountq
cannot survive without a 3 ountry, the B country
cannotonly survive without the A countr~r;it elm
seems to have the remms and sgilIs to rebuild
the A country in about I o years."

The achievement of such a rate of racoveq,
however, depends on the a m m p t h "that extensive reorganization d d be aceompWd within
perhaps six months." Accmdiq to the report,
"the initial phase of mmmic a c t i v i q . would
be dominated by reorgmkathn problems.
Some of the problems ape physical, such as the
petding up of capital that has suffered only
partial dmage (for a m p l e , el*
power grids,
open-hearth furnaces without chimneys), h n tambation of f&ee
i m m o b W by fallout,
and even the dispod of millions of dead. Other
pressing problems are institutional: pmemation
of the governmental frmewmlq m r ~ t i o nof
the monetary system and of decision-making
auhrityinbusinwrsen~,~b~hment
of markets fur consumer goods and raw matmiah
(though doubtlm c o n w e d in mtain 1
-,
aad h a t i o n of the labor few so that p p l e
support t h m d v ~by
s regular work (oftenin new
~ p a t i ~ n s ) )The
. " projected l%cqeMtiondm
mumes that the m e d
d not have sustained
my lowterm ps~"hdo&ddisability from their
experience, that the human germ plasm would
t0le~at.ea prolo+
q u m to levels of b d gmmd radiation fm above tbe pment level and
that &e environment would not have received
any permanent s ~ ~ l o g i m
damage.
l
It b anceded that these qudoas require
deeper study. Recuperation ~%onomiuz,for ex-

..

..

ample, involve%some d b t r w b g variations on the
familiar Malthusian equation. One student has
testified: ", the relative balance between surviving popdabu and surviving productive
capaci?~has a very important bearing on the
problem of economic recupnition.
[A] situa- I
tim could easily arb where the mmiving wealth
p r capita was greater than it is now.
[On]
the other hand. most of our population m y
survive., but the deskwtbn of p r o d d v e
cnpaciv may make it difEcult to support the
s u r v i w m in the long m. Thus the relative
imprhnce of the problems of recovery may be
inversely related to the level of direct ppulation
casualtie in tbe war.''

..

. ..

.

..

...

Still other questions remain to be studied. One
bas termed these "the social, psycholqgiand moral problems of recuperation"
cd,
and has said "these. . . are currently the hard
q d m . Many feel they are the dominating
I?
qW
i
t
h all thea q&m
remaining to be
studied, it is to be doubted that the nation as a
whole has accepted the fesibiity of themnonuclew war. Whether the present Admkhtetion
h a adopted thb t h d I do not $now. One may
supposer the prevailbq view i~ that the test of this
byphegis may not be made at our choiw. In any
w e , the iimt steps in preparation for the experiment have now been taken. The Federal Government has launched a $goo d o n program to
s m e y , mark and supply ao millionfalloutshelter
spaces in the central W. The President has
pmnally enwuragd dtizens to build fallout
sheltem on their OWXI premises and to stocg them
e2qm

I

1

1

for a twu-week stay. G o ' i beyond the results
from the computers, the papdarizers of the program promise that 97 percent will be saved.
In the Pkdent's judgment, the sole function
of the present program is to save the lives that
can h saved. Civil d e h , he said, "cannot deter
a nuclear attack." There is some k n t from this
narrow concept. Speaking for a great many military minds, General L~rmanL. Lemnitzer has
said "civil defense is a part of our total deterrent,"
in the sense that capacity to s k v e and -perate is calculated to d m r the enemy from & i h g
first. Still a third pition is advanced by some
academic and qd-academic experts on thenudear war; they prefer to believe that civil
defense will Lenddbili?qtoour nuclearamanal,
givingit what they call "First-Strike M b i l i q "
based on our capaciq to sustain a counteramck.

"Here Wim the Erad of War"
In the present atmosphere1it is %cult ta recall that 16 years ago the atomic scientists had
proved war is obsolete as a means for arbitrating
international political disputes. They did their
best et the time to put this undemtadhg acmss.
As Harold Umy pointed out, "atomic bombs don't
land in the next b w lea*
d v m to thank
their lucky stars and. to hope the next bomb
will also miss them." Urey and other scientists
"thought the psibilitiies would be so apparent
that when h d t y saw what sciencm had done,
they m d d see immediately that here was the
end of war." Since I gqg there has been no fundamental change in the phJrsiee that underlis this
mnclusion. No basic W v e r y has made thermonuclear war either mom violent or more feasible.
Long before Alamogodo, Urey's heavy-ww
process had made the heavy h t q e s of hydrogen

..

abundantly available. The hydrogen bomb was
implicit in the f d n bomb. All that was needed
was the technology that has come along h u l tanmusly and independently in the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R, and in other c o u n as
~ well.
~
To recapturethe mood of the nuclear physicists
we must take a still closer l
a& at what happens
in a nuclear explosion. We shall see that the
d a t i o n fmm Motom to megatons q u i r e s reconsideration of the premises of civil defense. The
nominal atomic bomb that terminated World
Waf II is said to h a ~ ehad the destructive power
of so kilotom of TNT. At Hiroshima the TNTequivalent blast effect leveled a roughly circular
area one mile in radius. The blast effect in this
case overrode and o h d the consequence of
the other two prompt effects of the nudear explosion. In the first instant of d-nation, the
bmb had showered the same area of one mile
radius with a lethal pulse of highenero radiatian.
This is the "initial radiation" r e f e d to in civil
defense literatum, During the next few sernnds
the &ball evolved and showered the same area
of one mile radius with t h e d energy sufficient
to ignite ~WFIBand inflict third-depe burns on
all human b e h p directly q m e d within one
mile of p u n d zero.

1
I

h e m i r a g R e h m a of TNT
The destructive capacity of d
l larger weapons
is expmed on the same d e of TNT-equivalent
exphive power. But his mile has decreasing
relevance to the true nature of these weapons IS
they grow larger. The ranges of the three prompt
effects-Salradiation, heat and blast-inmase
at different rates with inmaw in dm. This is rn
say that the three concentric c i r d of
~ destruction

I

and lethaliqthat were cot^ ' ow at Hirodha
increase at sig&cantly different rates as technology path more violenw into the n
h

)

mat slowly because this radiation k absorbed a d
scattered, and it falls so far within the other two

that it may be ignored. The cincle of total d e m a ~
tiou by blast p w s faster; its radius inaeasers as
the cube mot of the hmeaw in TNT-equivalent
tonnage. But the circular area showered with
thermal radiation grows- the fastest of all& its
radius inmeas the square root of the increase
inpopver.Thustheareaengdfedintheincendky
efbmof the bigger weapons reach- outward far
beyond the perimeter of the blast W e .

The tables show that the so-megaton b b ,
which is 1,000times b i i r than the so-ldloton
bomb, has a blast radius of lo miles (the cube root
of I , 000) and an
radius of go miles (the
square root of 1,000). By the same token, the
50-megaton bomb tested in the Soviet Union
must have a b h t radius of about 13 d e s but an
Wndiarg radius of 50; a loo-megaton bomb
would have a blast radius of a h t 17 miIes and
an
radius of 70. If loo, why not 1,000
megatons?Such a weapon would have an incendiary radius of so0 miles.
The mnd& to be comprehended here is that
the bigger the weaponis, the more prqmnder8~1tIy
it becomes an incen*
weapon. Them are two
d&ive elements in the incendiary effect of the
big weapon. The f k tis that the ignition of many
fim at once thmaghout the 3,000 square mils
around a so-megaton btzrst is sure to produca a
gigantic single fire, a adbgration so huge that

~~

~~

it must be reckoned as a meteomIogical event-a
h t o r m . The blast &ect would d ~ t r o yt
h
mnml city, but the &storm would incinerate
the metropolitan m a .

Not much is said about 6restarms in the literature of thermonuclear war and civil defense. For
perfectly abvious reasons, tha effect is not one of
thwe subjected to experimental study in the long
serim of weaporu &, There was some exprience
with h - w t o m igpitmi by wdinarg incendiary
bomb in World War XI: the h-emrm at Dresden
is eathated to have killed goo,ooo people in a
singlenight; at Hamburg, some 70,000;at Tokyo,
aome aoo,ooo. -B
bomb sheIters afforded
no protection in these storma;their occupantswere
found s d h a t e d and cremated when the shdwcs
were opned. Tbe firestorm at Hhshhna burned
inside the perimeter of the b b effect.
Tbb bus to the second decisive element
in the incendiary effect of the @antweapons. That
is the 4 e d p m h e t e r - m a ratio: as the
radius of the M e increases, the area within p
up as the square of the hmease, and the edge of
the firestorm moves fmher and farther away
from p u d m.
A number of people at HirP.
shima who had been sheltered from blast and
heat e s ~ p e dfrom inside the M e of d e o n
before the firestorm took over. It was this q - i en=, pmgr8md ktbthe mmputem, that moderated the casualty edmam in the 1,500-megaton
poundburst attack petdated at the 1959
hearings of the Joint m t t e e . A far smaller
p m m g e of the ppulahn would empe from
the vast interior of a so-megeton
Up to tbIe point I: have not mentioned fallout
in ~)nne&onwith therPeb
ig WeapI18. The

1

C

is, of mumf that the fire and especially the blast
effect of these weapons are maximized by airburst, by detonatingthem in the atmosphere high
off the ground at altitudes ppmioned to the she

of the particular weapon and its h b a l I . Under
these &cumstthere is no 1 4 fallout. A 20megaton weapon can, of course, be ground-burst.
But it would not be profitable to use such a
weapon for its radiologid effects, becam the
quare mileage destroyed by its incendiary effect
already approximates the area that could be
covered by intense fallout. The same logic applies
with increasing force to still larger weapons.

Six W&em States
In each case the h d i q effect can be magnified still further in exchange for blast effect by
bursting the bigger weapons at very high altitude.
Sin= most of the atmqhere- lies h r to t h e
ground, there is little loss of energy, and the cone
of effective thermal radiation gaias a still wider
radius at its base. A c m d q w one set of caldatiom, a I ,000-megaton bomb detonatedat satellite
altitude could set six We&ern-Weatern, not
Middle Western-states &re.
It is evident fromthe literature that no adequate
consideration has been given to the incendiary
aspect of thermonuclear m.Fm was not mentioned, for example, inconnection with the fallout
shelters that were s u p p e d to provide "nominal
protection against blast" in the model fallout attacks d d b e d at the HolifieId hearings in
August. Yet any blast effect would be felt well
inside the firworm. It was admitted at those
hearings that there has been no m
h on
"what might be called the environmental h e
problem," that is, the burning of forem, prairies

and croplands. It may be that the firestom is,
indeed, unthinkable.
Thmughout the lit81:etum it is implied that
people and p r o m outside t h e bull'seye are safe
from fire as well as blast. All they have to worry
about, one gathem, is fallout. The fact is that the
only thing they wn worry about is fallout.
W
i
t
h public atlgietJr thus directedtofallout, the
Admidmation's civil defeme program promises
fdout ~~X&III. The Federal effort to establish
fallout shelters in the central citiw will provide
s~~niffalloutisthehazardtowhich
the population is e x p a l . If not, thse shelters
will trap the urban populations ia bast and fire,
Cwcurrently, the individual citizen is urged to
provide for h h d the fallout "protection best
suited to his needs." The 60 pmant of the p p d a tion that has basements r e d l y h b b to it is
advised to install a "basement shelter [that] can
be built with soEd conmete bIocHs as a do-ity o w l f project" for f 150 to $200. Again, such a
shelter w i l l provide pmtedon if fdout (of the
dimated inhnsiq) is the only hazard to which
its occupants axe exped. Within the incendiary
radius of a big bomb, however, the basement
shelter becomes a firetrap.

Even with fallout as the strategic hazard, there
are other things to worry about. At the August
hearing on c i d defense an
psented this
m
a
i
t of a hou88holder standing on his own
properky "about s5 miles from an important,
somewhat i
s
o
w &at*
target." The target
comes under a so-megaton groundburst. "SUF
viva1 depends on how much this man has found
out about weapons effects, abut the precaution

he needs to take, andabove a l l what he has actually
done. For instance, a shelter with a shielding
factor of loo m h the radiation tolerable. Because of the slower rate of delivery of thermal
energ from the high-yield weapns, he can
reduce effectively the number of caIoriea hihim if he ducks behind mething opaque. After
a few s a n d s the bulk of the thermal energy will
have been emitted and he then has about s
minut- to get to a place whexe he'll be safe from
flying g h and other mhdes created by the b b c
wave which travels at the sped of sound. Depen*
on the meteomlopal db,of
course, the fabut cauld be
co arrive in
around BO minutas t~ an b u r and continueto fall
for about a to 6 h m . Thus it can be ben that the
effects of a detonation of so megatolls as q e rienced at ag miles do not conhnt our man
simultaneously. If he h o r n the sequence of
events, and if he lmom what he has t~ do to
sumive, he has time to act. H e does have to act
correctly the first time or take the consequences.
"At such &tames few knowledgeable, intell i n t people need be hurt seriously."

It is necessarg to add, from the t-ny
of the
same witness, that this man must take care not to
look at the h b a l l as it comas above the horizon:
"*
expriments during the tests above Johnston
Mand in 1958 show that burns to the retina can
cccw as far away as. ,345 statute miles." One
must mention also tbat "the pdbility of direct
thermal radiation h e i i transmitted by re-radiation into a shelter" is still under investigation.
The idea that fallout mnstitutes the -pal
hazard to the civilian population hi a derivation

..
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&om militaq theory. Remembering Pearl Harbor, our military thinkem are l~~nvinced
that the
enemy will. lay the primary weight of hi4 attack
on o m milimy installations. We have the word
from General Curtis E.laMay, who mmmanded
the soth Air Fom in our strike again& Hiroshima
and Negasaki: "There is no pint in going after
th civilian population as such," The rust attack
by the enemy wodd thedore be what is called a
" m t e r f m " attack, directed at the destmetion
of our capcitJr to retaliam. With a substantial
portion of our ret&af m i a d l e d in hardened missile b a s q the enemy warheads would
necessarily be ground-burst, and the civilianpop
ulation would a ( x 0 ~ 1 ycome under heavy
fallout as a side effect.

kTobe &wive the weight of thh attack would
have to be considerable. An independent study
by a m e t e d +
at the University of Arizona
shows that 300 megamu A d have to be laid
in a few minu- on the 10 hardened Titan bases
that ring t h e city of Tucsan. The same consideretiom apply apparently to other communities
where missile basas have been installed within
Iogbtidy convenientrange: Wxchita and Salina,
fiitth R d , A ~ k a n ~the
a ~Romt+Utim
~
oomplex in New Ymk; Lincoln, Nebrash; Altw,
Oklahomaj Abilene, Texas, and Plattsburgh, New
York, among others. With heavy pwdburrjt attacks directed at such tar-,
the nearby communities wauld come under fallout of intensities
far above thw against which the d ~ i t r y o d f
basement shelter, supplied for two weeks of
refuge, d d a f b d p t e h n . Apparently the
siting of m i d e hm has oonsiderably depressed
the prospas d muntq B. With the dtstrbution
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of other targets mom nearly approthat
of the economy and the ppdation as a whole,
one can see the Iogic in Admiral Arleigh A. Burke's
ddaration that "in general nudear war migsite
form can no longer attempt to destrop their
enemy's counterpart without destmying the
corporate body of the enemy state itself.

. .."

The elaborate studies of the fallout hazard can
be set aside entirely if the athker should chmw
to attack the population directly instead of by
side effect, As the expert who presented the
h y p h e t i d go,ooo-megaton fallout attack at the
August civil defense hearing said: "So far as
initid imp& of any a d ia oancumed, the Ievd
of fatalities is extremely sensitive to at-& design.'' The attacker could, for example, adopt the
strategy of "com&m plus bonus." By diverting lo pmt of the go,ooo megatons, or 3,000
mqatons, to civilian targets he could, -ding
to thig witnw, 'L$ill
es many asr 190 miuion
people." He would take as his bonus the substantially complete dastruction of U.S. civil'iatim.
The populationis a soft target and, as such, high1J
vulnerable to pmmpt e&a. It takes fewer
megatons to $ill the -rate
body of the state
than t o d m y the forces that are supped ta
defend it.

Civil defense, it is aid, "increases markedly
our ability to survive war if [the wer] is fought by
rational methods." But there is little reason t9
think that a real war d
lbe fought by the rational
strategies of game thwrg that are supplied as

inputs to a computer, The experience of history
s u g p t s that the h exchange, if 'Lrati~n&*'
will trigger an unlimited d a t i o n of violence,
going on to the final exhaustion and destruction
of the hstded capacity for violence. W e must
remembm %hima as well as Peml Harhr.
Not only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R but also
their allies and satellite9 aad the neutrals in line
of ftre faas the same dread w .
W e me ass u r d t h a t t h e empty worldof O n ~ b h b p u r e
fiction. But t h e Erestormof a thermonuclearwar
could work an ir~evemibledisruption of the d
and moral fabric of Western civibtioa The
kind of society that would emere h m the
sheltenr may be gu&
from the kind of saciety
that is prepahg to p into shelters now.

The d a t i u n ward the dtimate catastrophe
ie already under way. We are passing.fmm an era
of mearch and devdopment into an era of intercontinental push-button armaments in madinea
for action. The major t4ermondear powers will
soon have 0th- in their Sovian company. There
will be Ingger wmp~nsand more of them, and
earth satellites as well as &eta to deliver them.
Acxoss the continents and under the maas, the
weapns will b deployed in aver larger number
and vmiety. The danger of the totally irrational
addental war must mount as mnm2 over these
weapons becomes attenuated over oonstantly
lengthening chains of -d.
We are p m d y m e e a to this d a t i o n , in
the rising tide of dausness and brutality here at
home. It is to be seen, at the top level of our
Government, in the writing off of Tucsoa axid
other d i e s by the siting of missile bases in their
immediate environs. It e m p in an ugly way, at

the middle level, in the vigilante league of Las
Vegas and Bakewfield against the pmsptive
flood of refugeas from h Angels It shames our

people before the world inthe climax of American
privatism that @bes
a sawed-off shotgun as
equipment for the family f h t shelter,
The civil defense progrm of our Federal
Government, however else intended, must be
regarded as a step in the d a t i o n m.
This
is a sinister development because it works a
psychological subvmion nf both Government and
citizenrjr. It gives the sanetion of action to the
delusion that a thermonuclear war can be fought
and survived. It encowages statesmen to take
larger risks predicated on Fint-SCredibility
and Post-Attack R e c u p t i v e Capacity. It dise n g a p the citizen from vigihw over the rationality and responsibility of
elected officials.
On the other side of the world power contest, in
satisfaction d the equations of war-game theory,
it invites a Pmemptive Strihe. For the dubious
proteetion it procivil defense has e&
a
dangerom CQ& to national security.
It is clear that, in l a u d h g ib fallout-shelter
program, the Administration haa sought to find a
compromise. Between the stiU overwhelming
popular reluctance to accept violence as a m y of
life on the om hand and the p r m to "do something" on the other, the Administration has cut
its problem down the middle.

Pressure From Two Qlaarters
The Administration has yielded to p~essure
from essentially two quartexs. The &st originates
with irmpmible politicians in both @EYE who
have adoptedfallout defense as a mode of politid
dynamism. The second and much more significant
~ u r originam
e
with the military and its corn-

mitment to miliw solutions, backed by the
pwerful economic interest in those solutions that
has came to be the biggest business in the land.
But a primmy respomibility for this hoax on
public opinion must be attributedto thorn authors
of fraud by computer who produced the literature
that argues the feasibiliq of thermonuclear war.
The Adminkhation's p u d m e of thidi hoax
raises two grim p d d i t i e s . F'ht, it may have
seriously cornprombed its capacity to rally public
opinion in favor of the settlemeats it is seeking to
negotiate at the conference table. Smnd, in the
mood of mounting fear and truculence, the Administration may h d it has provoked demapgic
b a r fop a civil defense program ping far beyond the present one.

Such programs havebeen studied andestimated
in a preliminar~rway. The down payment on the

nation underground would be
$150 Won. But that is ody the fiscal cost. The
social cost of ping underground would not fall
short of the tQtal transformation of our way of
life, the suspension of our c
i
a ix&tutions, the
habituation of our people to violence and the
ultimate militarbtion of our &ety.
By that
h e it would surely be dEcult to defme the
ideological d c t that the war is supped to be
fought about, And by that time the technolqy
of themnucle8r war will no doubt be equal to
hunting out its targets undergmund.
If this analysis s
w that a third alternative
to the choice of surrender or death may be found
in the Garrison State, let me urge a fourth alternative. We must accept the truth that themw
nuclear war cannot settle even the most M n d able conflict to anybody's satisfaction. With all
cost of taking the
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due caution, at the present stage in the escalation
of temu; we must seek the settlement of political
differences by peaceful means. Concurrently we
must seek an immediate halt in the anasrace and
thereafter general and complete disarmament
under cantrols that will protect mankind fram its
resumption. The two elements are inseparable;
for it is clear that there would be no German
problem if we had disarmament and that there
can be no convention on disarmament that does
not include China.

The C o h u d m of Wi9tor-y
History has lagged behind the p r o w of tach-

now, md now an unpreoedented emergency

mnfrom the mntinuationof history.The conflia
that hang over from the gcad old pthermonuclear days cannot be arbitratedby war. They must
be settled before madness, stupidity, accident or
the arms race itself precipitates the war. If we
enter into n m t i o n in distrust and fear of the
other party, we must b a r in mind that the other
party beam the same distrust and fear of us. If w e
think they la& our sophisticated appreciation of
the menace of thermonuclear weapons, let us recalI that they have fresh in memory their a5
d o n dead of World War 11. Both sida are
driven to the conferem8 table by the same iron
compulsion that flows from the thermonuclear
inversion of the Golden Rule.

